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[30 ELR 10803]
An important battle is currently taking place over the future direction of environmental enforcement in the United
States. The conflict is in part between businesses and government; more fundamentally, however, it is between the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the states. EPA's vision of effective enforcement is one grounded in
deterrence, the theory that generally underlies societal efforts to control unlawful behavior. Many states, by contrast,
have been shifting to a more conciliatory, cooperation-oriented approach. Since environmental law rests on a
federalism model giving states authority to implement federal statutes but only under federal oversight, and since the
states' brand of enforcement does not follow EPA's deterrence-based policies, the area is rife with tension.
Several recent Articles in the Environmental Law Reporter have discussed significant enforcement issues, including
research about the efficacy of deterrence-based policies and efforts by EPA to tweak its traditional enforcement
approach. Those Articles, however, address only part of the current ferment about environmental enforcement. This
Article looks at the broader canvas of enforcement issues today: the debate between the states and EPA over
deterrence versus cooperation as a means to achieve compliance with environmental law.
First, the Article describes the enforcement approach being advocated by many states. To some, it represents an
innovative, superior way to achieve compliance. To others, the states' vision is a pretext for weakening enforcement
that will result in more widespread violations by regulated facilities. The Article also examines how EPA has shifted its
own enforcement policies in response to state pressures.
Next, the Article discusses what we know empirically about which system works better. There is relatively little
evidence about compliance assistance programs, more for deterrence-based approaches. The evidence shows that
deterrence-based approaches work, and that in the absence of meaningful sanctions, compliance suffers. The Article
then examines a few of the leading theoretical arguments for shifting to a cooperative-oriented strategy. Finally, it
details some elements of a reformed deterrence-based system that will work most effectively to assure compliance with
environmental law. This approach includes more compliance assistance, more flexible deterrence-based approaches,
and mandatory disclosure as an adjunct to enforcement.
Deterrence vs. Cooperation
What are the competing models of environmental enforcement? Broadly speaking, there are two different philosophies
that regulators can follow to achieve compliance. One is a deterrence-based approach, sometimes referred to as a
"sanctioning," "penal," by the book," or "enforced" strategy. The competing strategy is one based on cooperation,
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variously termed a "negotiated," "flexible," "compliance-based," or "conciliatory" approach.1 In shorthand, deterrence
relies on sticks to achieve compliance, while cooperation emphasizes carrots. In reality, most enforcement systems are
a combination of the two approaches rather than pure versions of either deterrence or cooperation.
Deterrence-Based Enforcement
Deterrence-based enforcement is the approach that Americans are most familiar with; it is the prevailing societal
strategy for regulating unlawful conduct. The deterrence model is premised on the idea that regulated entities are
rational economic actors that act to maximize profits. Decisions regarding compliance are based on self-interest;
businesses comply where the costs of noncompliance outweigh the benefits of noncompliance. The benefits of
noncompliance with environmental regulations consist of money saved by not purchasing pollution control equipment,
training workers, abating contamination, or taking other required measures. The costs of noncompliance include the
costs of coming into compliance once a violation is detected, plus any penalties imposed for being found in violation,
multiplied (discounted) by the probability that the violations will be detected. These costs can also include damage to
the business' [30 ELR 10804] reputation, potential tort liability, legal system expenses, and increased regulatory
scrutiny.2 They also include the less quantifiable but even more potent costs of going to jail and the stigma of criminal
conviction.
Under a deterrence model, the essential task for enforcement agencies is to make penalties high enough and the
probability of detection great enough that it becomes economically irrational for regulated entities to violate the law.
(Indeed, some economists have argued that since it is the product of fines and probability of detection that matters in
deterrence theory, enforcement costs could be minimized by raising fines as high as possible and lowering detection
resources proportionately, while still maintaining the same level of deterrence.) Deterrence theory identifies several
additional elements necessary to achieve both specific deterrence (deterring an individual violator from failing to
comply again) and general deterrence (deterring the broader regulated community from noncompliance). First, there
must be a credible likelihood that violations will be detected. Second, sanctions must be swift and certain. Third,
sanctions must be appropriate. Finally, regulated entities must perceive the presence of the first three factors.3
Deterrence-based enforcement has as its central goal the punishment of wrongdoers. If there is a breach of a legal
requirement, it deserves sanctioning. Inspections are designed to detect noncompliance and gather evidence to build an
enforcement case and use in judicial proceedings. Agencies respond to violations through legalistic and adversarial
processes. Imposing fines or taking other enforcement action is seen as a mark of success.
EPA's enforcement system traditionally has been grounded in deterrence theory (although as noted below in actual
practice EPA enforcement has been closer to a hybrid of deterrence and cooperation). Writing in 1995, Professor Joel
Mintz explains:
With the brief exception of the [EPA administrator Anne] Gorsuch era of the early 1980's, both the EPA's
written enforcement policies and its actual practices have consistently emphasized the initiation of formal
enforcement actions against violators of federal environmental standards . . . . The formal, legalistic nature
of EPA's enforcement efforts is reflected in the agency's system for measuring and publicizing enforcement
success. It is also evident in the EPA's sizeable legal staff, the high volume of cases it regularly refers to the
Justice Department for civil action or criminal prosecution, the monetary value of the civil and
administrative penalties it has assessed against violators, and the large body of enforcement policies,
guidance documents, and studies it has issued that require or urge the use of formal enforcement methods.4
Thus, for example, EPA's Policy Framework for State/EPA Enforcement Agreements provides that "quality
enforcement programs ensure that there is a timely and appropriate enforcement response to violations," and that "civil
penalties and other sanctions play an important role in an effective enforcement program."5 Another EPA policy
document explains that full compliance with environmental laws is most likely achieved when "awaiting governmental
(or citizen) response to noncompliance results in adverse consequences significantly greater than any economic
advantage gained by delaying compliance."6
Cooperation-Based Enforcement
A cooperation-based system of enforcement is premised on a different set of assumptions about why individuals and
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corporations comply with the law. It views corporations not as economic actors solely interested in maximizing profits,
but as influenced by a mix of civic and social motives, and generally inclined to comply with the law, Therefore, if
corporations are found in violation of regulatory requirements, they should be treated like partners, and they will
respond positively to suggestions and advice about how to achieve compliance. If the response to noncompliance is
sanction-oriented enforcement, regulated entities will become resentful and less cooperative with agency inspectors.
Since most businesses have a generalized commitment to abiding by the law, sanctioning noncompliance is generally
inappropriate and unnecessary.
Generally speaking, a cooperation-based system emphasizes securing compliance rather than punishing wrongdoing. It
disfavors legalistic responses. Inspectors are not primarily concerned with gathering evidence of violations for later
enforcement actions; they provide advice about compliance and engage in informal bargaining with regulated entities to
resolve violations. A cooperative system prefers variable rather than uniform rules; inspectors are given considerable
latitude in determining whether a facility is out of compliance and how to respond. Personal relationships between
agency staff and regulated facilities are considered important. A cooperative approach, moreover, uses rewards and
incentives rather than penalties for achieving compliance. Penalties are seen as threats rather than sanctions, and are
typically withdrawn if compliance is achieved. In fact, levying penalties, and indeed initiating formal enforcement
actions, is seen as a mark of the system's failure to otherwise obtain compliance.
While it is useful to distinguish between the theoretical models of deterrence-based and cooperation-based
enforcement, in practice most environmental enforcement systems are a combination of the two approaches. This has
been historically true, and it is true to a greater extent now as a result of recent reforms adopted by EPA and the states,
discussed below. It is an important point to make, however, because many of the recent calls for reforming
environmental enforcement attack the theoretical model of rigid deterrence-based enforcement, as opposed to the more
flexible model implemented in practice. In fact, numerous studies demonstrate that EPA and the states have always
used a hybrid strategy that includes elements of both coercion and cooperation, rarely relying on a strictly legalistic
model.7
[30 ELR 10805]
Background: The Push for Devolution
The states' drive to change enforcement practices is part of a larger effort to devolve greater environmental authority to
the states. This theme is certainly not unique to environmental law; the 1990s witnessed a strong anti-federal
government sentiment and a revitalized movement to diminish the role of the federal government and enhance state
power.
The states have been dissatisfied with aspects of their relationship with EPA for almost as long as federal
environmental laws have been in place. In 1975, for example, an EPA task force reported:
The deeply held belief [among state officials] that the joint State-EPA partnership, which is often cited in
the EPA program documents, is little more than a slogan. . . . Several State officials referred to program
delegation as a system in which the States do all the work and EPA retains the authority and takes the
credit.8
EPA has been trying to improve its relationship with the states for just about as long as well.
In the 1990s, however, state tensions with EPA and the demand for devolution intensified considerably, for a variety of
reasons. One is the fiscal crunch faced by state environmental agencies in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Resentment
over unfunded federal mandates exploded as an issue after amendments to the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA) in
1986, Clean Water Act (CWA) in 1987, and Clean Air Act (CAA) in 1990 imposed a host of new regulatory mandates
on local and state governments, without new funding to implement them. These additional demands on the states came
at a time when many states were experiencing budgetary shortfalls because of a recession and the federal government's
relative contribution to state environmental budgets was decreasing. From 1986 to 1996, EPA funding to the states
decreased by about 17%, and its contribution to state environmental spending declined from 58% to 20%.9
States and their allies also began calling for greater state autonomy on the ground that states can be more responsive to
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local conditions than the federal government. State leaders argue that they are closest to the regulated entities and have
the most interaction with them; states therefore can be more flexible and tailor enforcement priorities to address the
most pressing problems in their jurisdiction, rather than follow a nationally uniform, "one-size-fits-all" model prescribed
by the federal government. Other state leaders contend that the states are leading the way in experimenting with
innovative regulatory reforms, and that EPA's efforts at change have accomplished very little, demonstrating "that a
top-down, centralized system of reinventing environmental protection has not been successful in generating the
comprehensive reform we need."10 For example, the head of strategic projects for Florida's Department of
Environmental Protection told Congress in 1998 that "across the country, states are leading a revolution in how
environmental protection programs are managed and measured."11
State environmental agencies also maintain that they are far more sophisticated and capable than in the past, and
indeed, there is little question that state agency staffs are far more professional and competent now than in the 1970s.
State agencies administer over 75% of the major federal delegable environmental programs, and 65% of all delegable
programs, compared to just under 40% in 1993.12 State spending on environmental protection jumped from $ 5.2 billion
in 1986 to $ 12.5 billion in 1996.13 (These figures mask considerable differences in spending and capacity among the
various states.)14 The size of states' environmental staff has increased by approximately 60% over this period. State
agencies now conduct about 80% of civil enforcement activity each year.
At the same time that state capabilities have improved, state agencies have grown increasingly frustrated with many
aspects of EPA oversight of their programs. A 1995 U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) survey found that over
60% of program managers found the level of control exercised by EPA to be a significant barrier to effective program
implementation, and concluded that "many state managers continue to believe that the association more closely
resembles a parent/child relationship than a true 'partnership.'"15 Professor Denise Scheberle found similar concerns in
her detailed study of federal/state workings relations in five environmental programs.16 State environmental officials
expressed unhappiness about inflexible EPA oversight, burdensome reporting requirements, insufficient attention to
program outputs, and lack of significant input into EPA program decisions.
Calls for devolution have gained support from other quarters as well. Some proponents advocate greater state
autonomy as a means to take power out of the hands of EPA and transfer it to more sympathetic state fora.
Environmental [30 ELR 10806] regulation has generated intense opposition among regulated entities, and for many
EPA has become the focal point of criticism—the source of unduly restrictive and economically burdensome
regulation—and thus the subject of vitriolic attacks. One extreme, if nonetheless influential, strain of this argument is
represented by the comments of Republican leaders like Majority Whip Tom DeLay (R-Tex.), who compared EPA to
the Nazis: "The EPA, the Gestapo of government, pure and simply has been one of the major claw-hooks that the
government has maintained on the backs of our constituents."17 Likewise, support for devolution has come from some
recent (although strongly contested) scholarship questioning the underlying rationales for federal environmental
regulation,18 and from public policy reports advocating devolution.19
The State Approach to Environmental Enforcement
Enforcement issues have generated perhaps the most intense frictions between EPA and the states. One state official
testified to Congress that, "I think there is no EPA-state partnership in some areas of environmental enforcement.
EPA's perspective appears to be that they own the ranch and that we, the states, are the hired ranch hands."20 A
primary reason, therefore, that states want more autonomy is to pursue their preferred approach to enforcement. States
traditionally have been less enthusiastic about deterrence-based enforcement than EPA and more willing to forego or
reduce penalties. The difference now is that the states have developed a more affirmative and unified vision of what
enforcement should look like, and have been aggressively championing it. What is the approach being advocated by the
states?
While there are significant differences among individual states, and it risks oversimplification to discuss them
collectively, there nonetheless are many important similarities in how most approach enforcement issues. Generally
speaking, the states advocate a more cooperation-based enforcement strategy. Many states paint a picture of EPA's
model of enforcement as inflexible, mainly concerned with punishment, and focused on "enforcement for
enforcement's sake." They also contend that it is not effective. The Secretary of Delaware's Department of Natural
Resources and Environmental Control, for instance, wrote:
Competing Visions: EPA and the States Battle for the Future of Environme... http://www.elr.info/articles/vol30/30.10803.cfm
4 of 41 8/6/2010 11:01 AM
For the past two decades, environmental enforcement has been rigid, focusing almost exclusively on the
letter of the law. . . . Over the years, the command-and-control approach to environmental enforcement
has resulted in a regulated community that fears environmental agencies.
This fear impedes potential partnerships that could hasten movement toward environmental objectives.
Instead, critical information is withheld, and environmental improvements are delayed.21
Many states argue that the appropriate response to noncompliance in almost all cases is working with violators to
achieve compliance, rather than initiating enforcement actions. Virginia's Secretary of Natural Resources told Congress:
The truth is that enforcement action means "failure" not success. It is certainly not the best tool to improve
the quality and condition of the resources which make up our environment . . . Policies which focus on
compliance with environmental laws are better for the natural resources than policies which focus on
enforcement.22
Likewise, an official of the Ohio EPA characterized the state agency as "not an enforcement agency."23 Thus, many
states believe that resources should be shifted away from traditional enforcement activities toward compliance
assistance programs. They do not believe in the central role of enforcement actions or penalties in securing compliance.
And many have sought to provide maximum incentives for self-auditing through audit privilege and immunity
measures.
Enhanced Compliance Assistance
States start from the premise that education and technical assistance is the preferred tool for achieving compliance. One
state agency chief explains:
In Delaware, we work with violators to get them back into compliance as quickly as possible. Using
compliance assistance as an option of first choice, we can usually achieve that goal much faster, cheaper
and with far greater goodwill than through aggressive enforcement.24
Thus, over the past 5 to 10 years the states have sought to develop and expand compliance assistance programs,
particularly programs aimed at small businesses. These include workshops, newsletters, fact sheets, web page
information, technical assistance visits, and "plain-English" guides explaining regulatory requirements.25 In the states'
view, many small businesses lack the expertise and resources needed to fully comprehend what environmental
requirements apply to them and what they need to do to comply. Moreover, compliance assistance programs, especially
[30 ELR 10807] those provided on an industrywide level, can more efficiently reach larger numbers of small facilities
than traditional permitting and enforcement approaches. Many programs offer technical assistance in exchange for a
commitment by firms to promptly correct any violations or take other actions in exchange for site-specific evaluations.
The Illinois Clean Break project is one such example. States have also developed compliance assistance programs
aimed at small towns and communities. Others have sought to combine technical assistance with special recognition for
facilities who achieve compliance (or go beyond compliance). Another idea being implemented by a number of states is
trying to make regulations easier to understand (something Congress mandated in 1996 for all federal rules in the Small
Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act). Ohio's EPA, for instance, is redrafting portions of the state's rules
dealing with removal of hazardous substances from abandoned facilities in "easy to understand plain English," and
including in the rules a troubleshooting guide, helpful examples, and references.26
Fewer Inspections, Enforcement Actions, and Penalties
At the same time that states have expanded compliance assistance programs, they have cut back on the use of
deterrence-based tools—traditional inspections, administrative and civil enforcement actions, and penalties.
Thus, for example, very rough EPA data shows that the number of Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA)
inspections conducted by states declined by 50% from fiscal year 1996 to 1998, and that state inspections for all
federal environmental programs declined about 12%.27 Likewise, a series of audits by EPA's Inspector General and the
GAO in the late 1990s found that states were not carrying out the monitoring and inspection activities required by EPA
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policy. For example, a 1998 audit found that over one-third of major air facilities in New Mexico had not been
inspected in the prior seven years.28 EPA's audit of Idaho's air program found that many source emission reports were
not timely reviewed by the state (almost 25% were two to six years old), and that only one-third of facilities were
inspected as often as EPA required.29 In a review of the air programs in Maryland, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and
Washington, EPA found that about 18% of the inspections were not thorough enough to determine whether facilities
were in compliance—because of failure to conduct requisite tests or evaluations, or to follow up on problems identified
during the inspection—and that an additional 17% failed to contain adequate documentation.30 EPA concluded that
there were "fundamental weaknesses with state identification and reporting of 'significant violators' of the [CAA] that
extended to all elements of the process, from inspection to entry of data used to track noncompliance."31 In 1996, state
auditors found that the Virginia Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ) did not have an adequate system for
reviewing discharge monitoring reports filed by facilities under the CWA.32
On the other hand, the number of inspections in some states has increased as a result of state efforts to streamline and
improve traditional inspection practices. For example, Illinois reported a tenfold increase in the number of RCRA
generators it inspected in the latter part of the 1990s; Nevada similarly reported a "dramatic" increase in hazardous
waste inspections.33 More generally, a survey of state hazardous waste program managers found that the great majority
had modified traditional RCRA inspection procedures in one of several ways: reducing the scope or frequency of
inspections, including for historically compliant facilities or those that conducted audits; modifying mandatory
inspection checklists, or reducing post-inspection reporting requirements.34
Likewise, the survey reported that 29 states conduct compliance assistance inspections that have no enforcement
repercussions for regulated entities. In some states these inspections are not part of the states' enforcement program. In
a number of other states violations detected during the inspections are not sanctioned so long as they are minor. Eleven
states reported that the compliance assistance inspections were geared toward small or new businesses, providing them
with a period of time after inspection to come into compliance.35
Many states now greatly temper or forego entirely enforcement actions in response to violations. EPA reported a 50%
decline in the number of the state enforcement actions initiated under RCRA between 1993 and 1997.36 Other internal
evaluations by EPA in 1998 found dramatic drops in overall state enforcement of federal statutes—in some cases up to
75% or 95%—over the course of several years in the mid-1990s.37 (States contend that the data—which was not
directly published by EPA but came out in response to a Freedom of Information Act request made by journalists—is
highly inaccurate; EPA argues that it is generally reliable. While the data is clearly imperfect, it seems useful as a very
rough approximation of enforcement activity trends.)38 Regardless of the dispute over these EPA numbers, the overall
trend toward fewer actions under RCRA and other statutes is unmistakable (and indeed not contested by the states).
Apart from foregoing actions, in many instances [30 ELR 10808] actions taken by the states are not "timely and
appropriate"—characteristics which, according to deterrence theory described above, are necessary to deter future
violations. In Virginia, for example, a harshly critical audit by the State's Legislative Audit and Review Commission in
1996 found that the DEQ repeatedly failed to take meaningful enforcement action against chronic and serious
violators.39 In separate audits of Arkansas, Idaho, Louisiana, New Mexico, Pennsylvania, and Texas, EPA's Inspector
General found that actions against significant violators were not timely.40 An audit of New York's air program found
that the state did not file timely and appropriate actions against a number of significant violators.41 EPA also found that
local air districts in California did not escalate enforcement actions in response to repeat violations.42 Another review
found that Rhode Island regularly failed to take timely and appropriate enforcement actions against RCRA violators or
ensure that violators complied with enforcement compliance schedules, and concluded that the state's "failure to
dedicate available resources to RCRA indicated a lack of management commitment to effective enforcement."43
Many states also have chosen to de-emphasize penalties as a means of securing compliance. Several have adopted
amnesty programs that expressly prohibit sanctions for minor violations. Under New Jersey's "grace period" law, for
instance, when state or local enforcement agencies detect minor violations of environmental laws, a facility will not be
penalized if the violation is corrected within 30 to 90 days. The law also bars regulators from imposing penalties against
persons who voluntarily disclose minor violations within 30 days of discovery, immediately remedy them, and achieve
compliance.44 Likewise, recent California laws mandate that minor violations of state hazardous waste, air, and water
pollution requirements result in "notices to comply"—informal agency notices that instruct the facility to correct the
violations within a given time period—rather than penalties.45 Washington has a similar amnesty law, while Missouri
has promulgated a "grace period" regulation within its CWA program.46 As noted above, moreover, numerous states
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give firms, often small businesses, a certain time after receiving compliance assistance to come into compliance without
fear of enforcement.47 Other states have initiated expedited enforcement processes, such as reducing penalties in
exchange for prompt settlement of violations.48
Beyond these initiatives, many states have stopped imposing penalties on violators, including significant violators, or
now impose only very limited fines.49 (Some states never assessed large penalties in the first place.) An EPA survey of
13 states found that from 1991 to 1996, only 2 imposed RCRA penalties that were at least 50% of their EPA region's
average; in some states the penalties were as low as 4% to 6% of what the regions assessed.50 In Virginia, the state
imposed $ 4,000 in fines for water quality violations in fiscal year 1996, a 98% drop from three years earlier.51 In New
York in the mid-1990s, fines and penalties collected by the Department of Environmental Conservation fell by 45%.52
EPA's auditors found that Idaho failed to take enforcement action or impose any penalties against 75% of the
significant air quality violators identified. In many instances, the sources had a history of repeated and continuous
violations of permit conditions that had lasted for years.53 In a review of enforcement records for facilities in five
industrial sectors in Michigan, Ohio, and Pennsylvania, the Environmental Working Group found that penalties were
imposed on only 1 facility out of 38 major facilities that violated the CWA between 1997 and 1999.54
When penalties are imposed, according to a host of studies, they frequently are inconsistent with EPA's penalty
policies. Many states fail to recover economic benefit when assessing penalties—a core element of deterrence theory
designed to ensure that companies do not gain from noncompliance and that there is a level playing field among
regulated entities. (This issue has been a long-standing EPA concern about state programs.) A California environmental
group found that from 1992 to 1997, out of over 9,000 violations of water quality requirements in Los Angeles and
Ventura counties, the local regional water quality control [30 ELR 10809] board assessed fines in 14 cases, less than
0.5% of the total; routinely waived or reduced penalties if a facility agreed to come into compliance; and failed to
capture the economic benefit of noncompliance.55 EPA reviews found that only one of six states surveyed regularly
assessed economic benefits for air quality violations; another audit reached similar conclusions about several states and
RCRA violations.56 In some states, the economic benefits of noncompliance are not even documented57; other states do
not have procedures for determining it.58 Some states do not even have the authority to request the financial
information needed to calculate economic benefit,59 while others contend that legal precedent prevents them from
calculating or assessing economic benefit.60
Not only are state penalties frequently inadequate by EPA standards, they fluctuate by jurisdiction. EPA's study of
RCRA enforcement in 13 states, for instance, found a "wide variation" in the average size of penalties assessed, and
"inconsistent penalty practices that can result in inconsistent enforcement" from one state to another.61 A study of CAA
enforcement in several states likewise noted that average penalties assessed ranged from over $ 68,000 in Michigan to
under $ 2,500 in California.62
Idaho is an instructive, if perhaps unusual, example of the states' distaste for penalties. EPA's audit of Idaho's air
enforcement program identified a major stationary source (a mining and processing facility) that had a long history of
air quality violations and was identified by the DEQ as a significant violator in July 1996. The DEQ made numerous
attempts to get the facility in compliance through the administrative process, without success. The facility owner took
the position that the facility could never be brought into compliance because of its age but that he needed to continue
to intermittently operate it. In August 1997, the DEQ referred the case to the state Attorney General's office for civil
enforcement, stating that the owner continued to operate the mill knowingly and willfully violating Idaho's rules and the
terms of a consent order. After discussions with the Attorney General, the owner agreed to stop operations of the mill
until it could be operated lawfully. The Attorney General then wrote to the facility, confirming the agreement, and
stating that as a good-faith gesture, and to encourage compliance, the DEQ was returning a $ 3,250 check that the
facility had made as a partial payment for numerous penalties incurred for violations of the consent order. At the time
of the EPA audit in December 1997, other outstanding penalties from the past two years had not been paid, and the
facility was still out of compliance.63
Before concluding this discussion, it is worth reiterating that the states are not monolithic, and that not all of them have
discarded deterrence-based approaches or strayed from EPA's enforcement policies. As noted above, numerous states
have sought to simplify and improve traditional inspections, enabling them to inspect more facilities. EPA Inspector
General audits found that the Illinois EPA and New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) were taking
appropriate enforcement action against significant noncompliers under RCRA.64 The Washington Department of
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Ecology significantly increased the number of water quality penalties and administrative orders it issued from 1989 to
1999. It also slightly increased the number of enforcement actions it took, although the number of permitted facilities
increased by about fourfold during this period.65
In addition, some states also have adopted tougher penalty regimes. In 1999, for example, California adopted legislation
requiring mandatory minimum fines of $ 3,000 for serious or repeat violations of state water pollution control
requirements.66 Serious violations are discharges that are 20% or 40% in excess of effluent limits, depending on the
pollutant.67 The bill was prompted by a series of studies showing a pervasive lack of enforcement by the state's local
water boards.68 The California legislation was modeled after a 1991 New Jersey statute that similarly imposes
mandatory minimum penalties for clean water violations.69
Finally, it bears emphasis that many states are unapologetic about their curtailment of traditional inspections, penalties,
and enforcement actions. Some dispute the accuracy and significance of EPA (and other) data, arguing, for example, as
in the case of Pennsylvania, that disagreement with EPA over what constitutes a "significant violation" explains
supposed state failures to follow EPA's policies. More generally, the states contend that their departure from these
deterrence-based enforcement practices is appropriate given their different vision of how best to achieve compliance.
[30 ELR 10810]
Audit Privilege and Immunity Laws
A central element of the states' enforcement approach is greater reliance on industry self-policing and self-regulation,
particularly voluntary audits. An environmental audit is a systematic review of a facility's compliance with
environmental requirements.70 Companies, especially larger firms, began auditing with some frequency in the 1980s due
to increasingly aggressive enforcement activity by the government, including stepped up criminal enforcement, as well
as the recognition that audits can save money by identifying production efficiencies, ways to reduce waste generation,
and so forth.
As companies began auditing more regularly, they began lobbying the states for audit privilege and immunity
provisions, arguing that without such protections firms would forego audits because of fear that the information
discovered would be used against them in enforcement actions or tort lawsuits. The movement for privilege legislation
gained momentum due to a well-publicized case in Colorado in which the government supposedly relied on information
discovered during an audit to prosecute Coors for violations of the CAA. (In fact, agency use of audit information in
this manner has been the very rare exception, and even in Colorado, state officials maintain that the violations came to
light because of a government-ordered inventory, not a voluntary self-audit.)71 In 1993, Oregon passed the first audit
privilege law, and since then, virtually every state has considered some type of related legislation or policy. Twenty
four states currently have audit privilege or immunity statutes; another one, Oklahoma, has a rule providing for penalty
immunity under certain conditions. (Idaho had a law that was sunset at the end of 1997.) An additional 14 states have
administrative policies to encourage voluntary audits and self-disclosure of violations, in most cases akin to EPA's audit
policy, discussed below.
The privilege measures generally bar the use of audit documents as evidence in litigation over compliance with
environmental laws, and otherwise allow them to be withheld from public or governmental disclosure. The scope of the
privilege varies by state.72 The immunity laws protect companies from sanctions for environmental violations if the
violations are discovered pursuant to the audit, voluntarily reported, and corrected within a certain time. (A few states
do not require the identification of a violation to have come from an audit.) Almost all of the measures provide
immunity in civil and administrative actions; around one-third of them also grant immunity in criminal proceedings.73
EPA's Enforcement Reforms
For its own part, EPA has made an important effort to "reinvent" its own enforcement program, although its core
enforcement messages have remained the same. In 1993, EPA changed (and substantially expanded) its headquarters'
enforcement office, as well as the name of the office. The change in title, from the Office of Enforcement to the Office
of Enforcement and Compliance Assurance (OECA), signaled EPA's intention to expand its reliance on compliance
assistance and compliance incentive programs. EPA's reforms have been motivated by some of the same considerations
prompting state initiatives, including a recognition of the limited resources available for deterrence-based enforcement.
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As explained by one top administrator: "The widening gap between government's compliance assurance mandate and
the resources it can apply to it means there will simply never be enough inspectors and government attorneys to
achieve significant levels of compliance through enforcement actions alone."74
While expanding its menu of compliance-promotion activities, EPA has regularly asserted its continuing commitment to
the central role of traditional, deterrence-based enforcement. In the agency's view "[a] strong and vital enforcement
program is critical to the success of EPA's environmental programs, including compliance assistance and compliance
incentive programs."75 According to EPA, "for at least three reasons a vigorous enforcement effort is vital to the
success of alternative compliance strategies." First, "enforcement motivates regulated entities to comply with the law.
. . . The prospect of sanctions for noncompliance compels regulated entities to make an effort to comply. They come
forward to use compliance assistance or various audit and incentive policies to avoid sanctions." Second, "enforcement
provides specific and general deterrence." Third, "enforcement ensures economic fairness among regulated entities."76
[30 ELR 10811]
Compliance Assistance
EPA began actively expanding its own compliance assistance programs in the mid-1990s. It has established nine
compliance assistance centers for various industrial sectors, each of which provides "plain English" guides about
comliance requirements, technical assistance, and pollution prevention training to regulated entities. EPA also has
developed "sector notebooks" for 30 industries, to "help owners and operators of regulated industries understand their
regulatory obligations through comprehensive plain-English guides." EPA also recently announced that it would
provide compliance assistance information within 90 days of issuing any economically significant rule so that it is
available before the new requirements become effective.77 Additionally, under a directive issued by President Clinton
in 1998, EPA (and all other federal agencies) are required to use "plain language" in all rules issued after January 1,
1999.78 According to EPA, in Fiscal Year (FY) 1999, its compliance assistance programs reached 330,000 entities
through on-site visits, hotlines, workshops, training, and distribution of checklists and guides.79
EPA has also sought to encourage state compliance assistance programs through policy guidance, joint initiatives, and
financial assistance. For example, in 1995, it adopted a Policy on Flexible State Enforcement for Small Community
Violations that accepts compliance assistance as an alternative to traditional enforcement against small communities
(small communities are defined as having fewer than 2,500 residents).80 The policy provides that EPA will not initiate
its own enforcement actions against small community violators where a state has waived all or partial penalties,
provided that the community has requested compliance assistance from the state and takes steps to achieve compliance
promptly. (Criminal violations and violations that pose imminent threats are excepted.) EPA reports that this policy has
prompted several states to develop small community compliance assistance programs, and it has provided grants to
several states to help them pilot such programs.81
Compliance Incentives
EPA has sought to encourage voluntary corporate auditing and other self-regulatory efforts with its policy on
Incentives for Self-Policing, first adopted in 1995.82 The policy rejects the privilege and immunity approach adopted by
many states and instead grants enforcement leniency to firms that voluntarily disclose and correct violations that they
discover. For firms that conduct audits or have systematic compliance management systems in place, EPA will not seek
gravity-based penalties for violations found that are promptly disclosed and corrected. For other entities, EPA will
reduce gravity-based penalties by 75% for violations that are promptly disclosed and corrected. The Agency will,
however, seek to recover any economic gain the firms have realized from noncompliance unless the benefit is
insignificant. As of October 1999, a total of 670 companies had used the policy to disclose violations at 2,700 facilities;
EPA reports that the number of participating companies has doubled each year since the policy was issued in 1995.
After completing an evaluation of the policy in 1999, EPA declared that it was working effectively, and proposed only
very minor revisions to it.83
In its small business policy Final Policy on Compliance Incentives for Small Business, EPA makes the most significant
departure from its penalty policies in an effort to promote environmental compliance among small businesses.84 Under
the policy, EPA will forego penalties entirely (economic benefit recoupment as well as the gravity component of a
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penalty) when a small business makes a "good-faith" effort to comply with environmental requirements by either
receiving on-site compliance assistance or conducting an environmental audit and promptly disclosing any violations
detected. Small businesses are defined under the policy as companies employing 100 or fewer persons on a
companywide basis.85 In FY 1999, 76 businesses disclosed violations under this policy.86
EPA also has been seeking to promote the use of environmental management systems (EMS), although thus far in a
very cautious fashion. EMS refer to systems that treat environmental issues as a management concern that should be
addressed in the same systematic manner as other management issues such as cost and quality. They seek to reduce the
environmental impacts of a firm's activities by instituting various internal management systems. EPA conducted a
one-year pilot project to encourage EMS, the Environmental Leadership Program, and several regions have adopted
policies to encourage EMS. For example, under Region I's "Star Track" Program, companies agree to implement EMS
similar to the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) 14001 management system (discussed below),
conduct an annual compliance and EMS audit, prepare and publish an annual environmental performance report, and
triennially have their audit results reviewed and certified by an independent third party. In exchange, the companies
receive [30 ELR 10812] public recognition, a reduction in EPA inspections and penalties for self-corrected violations,
and expedited permitting.87 EPA's Region IX has initiated a "Merit" program to encourage EMS among small businesses
and metal finishing firms, and EPA is also funding a pilot EMS program focusing on municipalities. In 1998, EPA
issued a policy statement supporting EMS and announcing that it would do more to promote their use, both to help
firms increase compliance and achieve superior environmental performance.88 EPA has funded a number of state and
local EMS pilot programs, and is supporting an ongoing study of EMS pilot projects in 10 states (and 2 of its own pilot
projects) to determine the effectiveness of EMSs.89
Improving Traditional Enforcement
EPA has also taken steps to tweak its traditional enforcement strategies. One example is its Supplemental
Environmental Project (SEP) Policy that allows companies to reduce penalties in exchange for environmentally
beneficial projects.90 Environmentally beneficial projects "must improve, protect, or reduce risks to public health or the
environment at large," and can include pollution prevention, facility assessments and audits, compliance promotion, or
other activities. Notably, however, the SEP Policy adheres to a core principle of EPA's penalty policy: settlements
involving SEPs must recoup economic benefit, plus at least a small percentage of gravity-based penalties. EPA's
rationale for this requirement reiterates the principles articulated in its penalty policies concerning the importance of
penalties for deterrence and fairness:
Penalties promote environmental compliance and help protect public health by deterring future violations
by the same violator and deterring violations by other members of the regulated community. Penalties help
ensure a national level playing field by ensuring that violators do not obtain an unfair economic advantage
over their competitors who made the necessary expenditures to comply on time . . . .91
EPA's use of SEPs has been growing; it obtained $ 236.8 million in SEPs in fiscal year 1999, up from $ 90 million the
previous year.92
Interestingly, while EPA is promoting a broader range of compliance tools, its regional offices appear to be doing a
somewhat better job of following EPA's deterrence-based policies in their own enforcement programs. Recent GAO
and Inspector General studies documented shortcomings in regional enforcement, including failure to recover economic
benefit, take timely and appropriate action against significant violators in certain cases and flaws in enforcement data
and information management systems,93 but these problems were far fewer than those associated with state programs.
Moreover, the audits show that the regions have improved considerably in their implementation of EPA's enforcement
policies, particularly penalty policies, during the 1990s.94
Is Major Reform Appropriate?
Is the shift in enforcement philosophies advocated by the states warranted? Should we shift away from deterrence, as
the states have been demanding, and rely more on cooperative strategies?
This section is divided into two parts. First, it examines what we know empirically about what works best to promote
compliance with environmental laws. To date, there is little evidence about the efficacy of cooperation-oriented
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strategies, and even less that directly compares deterrence and compliance strategies. There is more, although still
relatively limited, empirical research about deterrence-based policies; these studies show that traditional enforcement
activity improves compliance, and that in its absence, compliance suffers.
Second, it discusses some of the prominent theoretical justifications advanced in support of greater reliance on
cooperative strategies. These arguments highlight some significant limitations of a pure deterrence model, but they do




Research on Cooperative Strategies
What evidence exists about the relative efficacy of alternative approaches? Despite the widespread calls for moving
away from a deterrence-based enforcement, there is relatively little data to support the argument that cooperation
works better to achieve compliance with environmental law.
Thus, for example, researcher Kathyrn Harrison has noted that "past studies that have hailed the merits of cooperative
enforcement have offered surprisingly little by way of empirical support," and also that "it is quite remarkable how little
we know about the environmental effectiveness of voluntary programs, although that has not stopped some proponents
of cooperative approaches from drawing positive conclusions."95 Two other leading academics likewise have observed
that:
scholarly attention has focused much more on building credible arguments for particular points of view
than on evaluating their effectiveness based on actual experience in the field. As a result, there is little in
the way of empirical evidence that can be used in deciding which enforcement techniques [approaches
based on deterrence or cooperation] are most likely to achieve regulatory goals.96
Another recent report concludes that "[a] vigorous debate continues about what really works, but there is still no
objective way to determine which techniques for compliance assurance are most productive, either for creating
deterrence or for improving the environment."97
In part, the lack of data about cooperative methods reflects the fact that some of these approaches, such as
comprehensive compliance assistance programs, or incentives for environmental auditing, are relatively new. More
fundamentally, the dearth of data is due to the fact that until very recently, little attention has been devoted to
examining the effectiveness of cooperative strategies, and to the difficulties inherent in evaluating how well different
enforcement strategies work. Thus, to date many evaluations of cooperative approaches report the level of program
activities, such as the number of entities reached through compliance assistance programs or the number of facilities
that conducted environmental audits under audit privilege laws or self-policing policies.98 This situation is starting to
change, as the states and EPA have made the development of expanded performance criteria a key element of the new
federal/state partnership system launched in 1995 to replace the traditional system of EPA oversight of the states
known as the National Environmental Performance Partnership System (NEPPS). EPA also is supporting pilot projects
in 12 states to evaluate the effectiveness of compliance assistance (and other enforcement) programs, and is funding an
ambitious research agenda to determine what motivates corporate compliance and environmental performance,
including the effectiveness of various cooperative-based (as well as deterrence-based) approaches.99 EPA likewise is
sponsoring research by the Environmental Law Institute (ELI), the University of North Carolina, and the Multi-State
Working Group on Environmental Management Systems to determine the effectiveness of EMS in improving
environmental compliance and performance.100
A few studies indicate improvements in compliance rates after cooperative strategies were substituted for traditional
practices. For example, a pilot cooperative compliance program conducted by the California Occupational Safety and
Health Administration (Cal/OSHA) in the early 1980s resulted in significantly lower accident rates at the participating
job sites than at comparable company projects or comparable projects by other firms in California.101 Under the
program, Cal/OSHA largely refrained from traditional enforcement activities at some large construction sites in favor of
Competing Visions: EPA and the States Battle for the Future of Environme... http://www.elr.info/articles/vol30/30.10803.cfm
11 of 41 8/6/2010 11:01 AM
self-regulation by a joint labor-management safety committee. Cal/OSHA stopped its routine compliance inspections at
these sites, and instead assigned a compliance officer to assist the safety committee in devising solutions to problems at
the sites.102
In another instance, federal OSHA similarly has found benefits from its Voluntary Protection Program (VPP).
Employers who have outstanding safety records and a program for identifying and correcting workplace hazards
assume primary responsibility for compliance monitoring and are exempted from routine agency inspections.103 In 1992,
with 150 worksites participating in the program, injury incidence rates averaged from 35% to 65% below the expected
average [30 ELR 10814] for similar industries, and workday injury rates were 60% below the expected average in
similar industries In 1996, OSHA reported that in the prior three years participation in the program had doubled, and
that injury rates at participating companies were 45% below the industry average.104 Likewise, a study by John Scholz
of OSHA enforcement suggests that the level of cooperation employed by enforcing agencies increases the
effectiveness of their enforcement efforts, as measured by lower injury rates among workers.105
A compliance incentive program implemented in the auto repair industry in Santa Rosa, California, also reported
positive results. In place of traditional enforcement practices, local regulators began an intensive program of providing
information and technical assistance to businesses. (In addition, the regulators awarded recognizable stickers to
complying businesses, and attempted to raise consumer awareness about the program.) Whereas before the campaign
the compliance rate hovered near zero, nearly three-quarters of the repair shops were fully compliant after two
inspections.106 Since then, according to city officials, compliance rates have remained quite high.107
We also are starting to see some data analyzing the effectiveness of compliance assistance programs being implemented
by the states and EPA. For instance, in a 1998 survey of state hazardous waste officials, several states reported
demonstrable improvements from various compliance assistance or other alternative enforcement activities.108 (One
state reported contrary results: in Maine, these alternative activities did not improve compliance or environmental
performance.) For example, North Carolina reported higher levels of compliance for facilities that attended a workshop
or received other forms of assistance than for facilities which did not (94% compliance vs. 75%). Nevada and Illinois
also both reported improvements in compliance from alternative compliance approaches, but did not separate out the
effects of compliance assistance activities from other reforms, such as shorter and streamlined inspections, that allowed
for a greater enforcement presence (for instance, a tenfold increase in the number of RCRA generators visited annually
in Illinois).
There are only a handful of studies directly comparing the effectiveness of deterrence and cooperative-oriented
strategies. A study by Kathryn Harrison of the pulp and paper industries in the United States and Canada, where
enforcement has been more aligned with the cooperative school, found that rates of compliance with effluent
limitations in Canada are significantly lower than in the United States.109 In particular, the study found that rates of
compliance with biological oxygen demand (BOD) requirements for Canadian mills were around 69%, compared to an
average in the United States ranging from 86% to 98%, and that compliance with total suspended solids (TSS)
requirements was 59% compared to an estimated 92% compliance in the United States. The evidence also suggests that
the U.S. firms would have a substantially higher rate of compliance with toxicity standards.110 Noting that the regulatory
systems of the two countries are very similar except for the divergent approaches to implementation, Harrison
concludes that "the findings thus constitute prima facie evidence that cooperative enforcement is less effective than the
more prosecution-oriented approach, at least in North America."111
Raymond Burby has conducted two studies comparing enforcement approaches. In his review of the nonpoint source
control programs in 20 states, he found that the degree of coercion that programs apply to the private sector and to
local governments is the critical element in explaining the program's effectiveness. Factors such as the frequency of
inspections, use of permit revocation as sanction for noncompliance, and a requirement of local regulation positively
impacted compliance. Cooperative approaches were less effective than deterrence, particularly those that relied on
building capacity and public awareness without providing technical assistance to regulated entities.112 In an earlier study
of local environmental enforcement in North Carolina, Burby and his colleague Robert Paterson found that both
deterrence-based and cooperative strategies were necessary to ensure adequate compliance with the state's
sedimentation and erosion control program by private developers. They concluded that deterrence-based aspects of the
enforcement system, including more frequent and lengthier inspections, were the key factors in ensuring greater
compliance with the more expensive requirements that approved plans be installed and maintained.113 On the other
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hand, a cooperative approach worked better at ensuring compliance with the performance standard of the
regulations—that all sediment be retained on site.114
Also instructive is a case study by Environment Canada comparing a voluntary compliance approach with more
traditional enforcement for three forest sector industries in British Columbia. The agency found that a period of
voluntary compliance resulted in "negligible or unsatisfactory changes in the quantity of pollutants discharged" by mills,
while after government enforcement efforts, discharges declined dramatically. It also reported similar, if less striking
[30 ELR 10815] results for 19 industrial sectors in the region: those that relied solely on self-monitoring or voluntary
compliance had a compliance rate of 60%, while those subject to federal regulation and subject to enforcement activity
had a compliance rate of 94%.115
Research on Deterrence-Based Approaches
We have considerably more research examining the impacts of traditional enforcement activities. Nonetheless, this data
is relatively limited; as leading enforcement scholar Mark Cohen writes, "until recently, there have been surprisingly
few empirical studies of environmental enforcement," in part because facility-level data about monitoring and
enforcement activities has not been easily available to researchers.116 EPA also recognizes this gap, and a significant
part of the previously mentioned research agenda it is pursuing is designed to determine how and why deterrence
works, and which deterrence-based tools are most effective.117
Thus, a series of studies of the pulp and paper industry in both the United States and Canada show that increased levels
of traditional enforcement activity—including inspections, the threat of inspections, timely and appropriate
enforcement responses, or other enforcement actions—tends to increase the rate of industry compliance (measured at
the plant level). For example, analyzing CWA compliance among U.S. pulp and paper mills, Wesley Magat and Kip
Viscusi found permanent improvements in discharge levels as a consequence of regulatory inspections and associated
enforcement activities. These activities substantially reduced discharges of BOD chemicals after about three months
and helped permanently reduce an individual firm's future pollution levels. They also had a major impact on compliance
rates; firms not subject to inspections and enforcement activities were twice as likely to be in noncompliance as those
subject to the activity. The firms were also more likely to report emission levels.118 An analogous study of the pulp and
paper industry in Canada found that both inspections and the threat of inspections had significant impacts on BOD
discharges; past inspections reduced BOD discharges by 28%.119 Inspections also increased the likelihood that plants
self-report their level of emissions.120 Eric Helland similarly documented that pulp and paper mills in the United States
that are inspected and have violations detected are more likely to self-report violations.121 Another related study
showed that EPA's policy of making a timely and appropriate response to violations resulted in sources in the pulp and
paper industry returningto compliance more rapidly than in the absence of agency activity. Specifically, a 10% increase
in monitoring activity led to a 4.2% reduction in the length of time that plants violated EPA regulations; a 10% increase
in enforcement responses led to a 4% to 4.7% reduction in the length of violation.122 The only somewhat inconsistent
study found that routine inspections of U.S. pulp and paper mills, as opposed to discretionary inspections targeted at
firms with previous violations, did not reduce the number of known violations at the plants. This may reflect the fact
that increased monitoring not only deters violations but also leads to increased detection and reporting of violations; in
some cases, the detection effect can outweigh any deterrent effect.123
A number of studies in other contexts reach similar conclusions about deterrence-based measures. Wayne Gray and
Mary Deily found in their analysis of the steel industry that enforcement activities—whether measured as total
enforcement actions or inspections only—increased compliance by steel mills with air pollution requirements.124 Very
preliminary results from an ongoing study show that compliance monitoring and enforcement activities reduce pollutant
loadings in the petroleum refining sector.125 An analysis of the environmental performance in a large sample of Mexican
factories found that regulatory inspections and enforcement were more important than any other single factor in
determining whether a plant was in compliance.126 An informal EPA review of RCRA inspections from 1990 to 1996
found that facilities which went longer periods without inspections (three or more years) tended to have more violations
detected per inspection.127 A California study found that due to stepped up enforcement by the State Department of
Toxic Substances Control (DTSC) over a five-year period the number of violations per facility inspection dropped
two-thirds, from 3.3. to 1.1, and that the percentage of facility inspections finding multiple violations dropped from
63% to 33%.128 The Indiana Department of Environmental Management found that in 65% to 70% of cases in which
enforcement actions were taken against facilities, follow-up inspections showed that the facilities complied [30 ELR
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10816] with environmental requirements.129 A 1998 study of the San Francisco Bay Area Air Quality Management
District's enforcement program found that noncompliance rates at nonretail gasoline stations were three times higher
than that found at retail stations. The study attributed this differential to the fact that the local district inspected
nonretail stations only one-third as frequently as commercial stations.130 Other studies have found that pollutant
emissions have declined as the probability of detection of a violation, and the size of fines levied for a violation,
increases.131
Likewise, several empirical studies have demonstrated that increased monitoring activities by the U.S. Coast Guard
reduces both the frequency and size of oil spills from oil tankers and barges.132 Notably, several of these studies
measured compliance at an aggregate level, as opposed to compliance by specific firms targeted for inspections,
demonstrating the general deterrent effect of monitoring activities. One study found no link between penalties and oil
spill impacts; however, as Mark Cohen points out, this may be due to the fact that in the context of oil spills, penalties
are a small fraction of cleanup costs.133 Another study of deep draft vessels (vessels with over 100 tons displacement)
determined that increases in Coast Guard inspections reduced the frequency of pollution incidents.134
Professor Evan Ringquist,in his detailed study of state and federal environmental programs, similarly concluded that the
strength of enforcement programs makes a significant difference in reducing pollutant emissions. He specifically found
that federal enforcement efforts, which generally tend to be more aggressive than state efforts, and state enforcement
efforts that were "consistent, focused and well-supported," resulted in greater reductions than weak and inconsistent
state programs.135 Professor Hilary Sigman found that states with greater enforcement activity had fewer reported
incidents of illegal dumping of used oil.136 Anecdotal evidence indicates that New Jersey's deterrence-oriented Clean
Water Act Enforcement Act has significantly improved compliance since it was adopted in 1990. The statute provides
for mandatory minimum penalties for serious violations and significant noncompliance and requires that penalties
recover the economic benefit resulting from violations.137 It also requires annual inspections of permitted facilities and
inspections of facilities at which significant noncompliance is identified within 60 days. According to the New Jersey
DEP, since the early 1990s, the number of total violations, serious violations, and instances of significant
noncompliance have dropped by amounts ranging from 80% to 90%. The law's general deterrent effect is demonstrated
by the fact that in this period enforcement actions also have declined by 73%, and penalties collected have declined by
88%.138 (Notably, the DEP also credits its expanded compliance assistance activities for playing a significant role in
improving compliance.) New Jersey also has significantly improved its comparative compliance ranking with other
states (as measured by the percentage of major facilities in significant noncompliance with the CWA), going from the
bottom third in 1995 to the top fifth in 1998.139 On the other hand, in their detailed study of the CWA, Professors Susan
Hunter and Richard Waterman concluded that higher levels of enforcement activity did not translate into improved
water quality outcomes, as measured by the percentage change in average pollutant concentrations of phosphorous,
dissolved oxygen, and dissolved solids between 1973-1975 and 1986-1988.140
A set of studies of occupational safety and health enforcement have documented similarly positive results from OSHA
enforcement activities. For instance, Ann Bartel and Lacy Glenn Thomas found that doubling inspection rates raised
compliance levels among regulated firms by approximately 25%; likewise, increasing the size of penalties imposed led
to a significant improvement in compliance rates.141 Another study of all manufacturing plants that received two or
more OSHA health inspections between 1972 and 1983 (a total of 35,426 inspections of 12,592 plants) estimated that
plants experienced a reduction of 50% in violations and 42% in worker overexposures to hazardous substances
following the initial agency inspection.142 Another examination of OSHA enforcement demonstrated that between 1979
and 1985, inspections imposing penalties resulted in a 22% decline in injuries in the inspected plant during the following
few years.143 Scholz and Gray found that [30 ELR 10817] OSHA enforcement has a significant effect on injuries in a
substantial portion of the manufacturing sector; specifically, a 10% increase in enforcement reduces injuries by
approximately 1% for large, frequently inspected firms. They report similar results from other empirical studies of
OSHA enforcement.144 The authors posit that their findings are consistent with the "bounded rationality" perspective of
corporate behavior, which emphasizes the limited ability of corporations to achieve all the goals they desire and their
consequent focus on the most obvious and immediate risks. Often these will not be those involving environmental
harm. Inspections improve safety records because they focus managerial attention on risks previously overlooked.145
Finally, and indirectly confirming the above research, a study by the Associated Press reviewing 778,000 OSHA
inspections from 1990 to 1995 found that 75% of the sites at which workers suffered serious accidents in 1994 and
early 1995 had not been inspected in the prior five years.146
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Conversely, we have considerable evidence showing that the absence of deterrence-based enforcement, that is, the
absence of a threat of meaningful sanctions, often translates into noncompliance. Thus, EPA and the states proved
singularly unsuccessful in bringing municipalities into compliance with SDWA requirements and municipal-treatment
plan violations using solely a compliance promotion approach.147 In the mid-1980s, close to 1,500 publicly owned
treatment works (POTWs) were out of compliance. One important reason for this was that many industrial users-41%
according to one GAO survey—were exceeding their limits on discharges to POTWs, and the efforts of POTWs to
coax compliance from these discharges through a voluntary approach were unsuccessful.148 Regulators then initiated a
major enforcement effort against the municipalities and filed judicial or administrative actions against almost 80% of
noncomplying facilities. This resulted in dramatic increases in compliance rates.149 Likewise, a study of enforcement of
underground fuel tank laws in northern California found that the conciliatory enforcement style of the local agency
failed to bring most regulated facilities into compliance.150 Out of over 1,000 instances of unauthorized releases from
underground fuel tank sites between 1985 and 1990 in Alameda County, California, the agency failed to take
enforcement action at 834 sites; out of these, 726 had not taken any voluntary steps to remediate the release 4 to 9
years after its occurrence (70% of which had affected or threatened groundwater).
A great deal of additional, more anecdotal evidence abounds. In Virginia, the legislative auditor concluded in 1996 that
the failure of the state to take meaningful enforcement actions resulted in persistent violators failing to come into
compliance.151 In the San Francisco Bay area, where the average fine imposed by the local air district against oil
refineries from 1989 to 1999 was in the modest range of $ 625 to $ 699 per offense, the three major oil refineries in the
area each committed approximately 115 violations during the last 3 1/2 years of this period.152 More generally, EPA,
the GAO, and environmental groups have assembled considerable evidence suggesting that weak enforcement and a
shift to cooperative-based approaches by state agencies has contributed to significant rates of industry noncompliance
in the 1990s. EPA estimated that in FY 1998, the rates of significant noncompliance for major facilities (by definition
those subject to the most regulatory attention) were 20% under the CWA, 21% to 28% under RCRA and at least 7%
(and probably higher) under the CAA.153 The overall noncompliance rate under the CWA for major facilities was 50%.
EPA also noted evidence suggesting widespread violations of its new source review requirements under the CAA.154
Reports by the GAO and others also demonstrate considerable levels of noncompliance. For instance, the GAO found
that in fiscal years 1992-1994, one in six major facilities was in "significant noncompliance" of the discharge limits in
their national pollutant discharge elimination system (NPDES) permits, and that the actual number could be twice as
high.155 Another review by the U.S. Public Interest Research Group (PIRG) found that during a 15-month period from
1995 to early 1996, close to 20% of the major industrial, municipal, and federal dischargers nationwide were in
significant noncompliance with their CWA permits in at least one quarter. The study additionally found that 21% of
major industrial dischargers exceeded their discharge limits by 50% or more during the first quarter of 1996.156
Likewise, a 1999 study shows that more than 39% of all major facilities in five large industrial sectors violated the CAA
in the two-year period starting in January 1997, and on average were out of compliance half the time during this
period.157 Another recent report found that nearly 30% of major facilities examined [30 ELR 10818] were in significant
noncompliance with their CWA permits during at least one quarter from September 1997 to December 1998.158
To be fair, one of the limitations in viewing this past experience is that the lack of punitiveenforcement measures often
has not been accompanied by a corresponding increase in compliance assistance measures or compliance incentives
—there has simply been lax enforcement. Moreover, not all of the evidence shows that higher penalty amounts
necessarily improves facility compliance. For example, in a review of close to 300 settled RCRA enforcement actions,
EPA Inspector General's found no difference in the average penalty imposed on those facilities that returned to
compliance versus those facilities that remained out of compliance despite being sanctioned.159 Scholz and Gray
likewise found in their study of OSHA enforcement that firms responded more to changes in the probability of being
fined than in increases in the amount of the fine imposed; Montserret Vildrach-Grau and Theodore Groves found that
the size of penalties did not effect the frequency of oil spills.160 Nonetheless, the clear weight of existing evidence
supports the view that lack of meaningful sanctions has a significant adverse effect on compliance rates. The GAO,
which has conducted multiple studies about compliance with federal environmental statutes over the past two decades
and whose findings therefore merit substantial weight, has concluded that penalties "play a key role in deterring
violators. . . . The [CWA] and other environmental statutes have been violated repeatedly when penalties have not
been applied."161
The Theoretical Bases for Rejecting Deterrence-Based Models
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Critics have advanced a number of theoretical arguments as to why a cooperative approach is superior to a
deterrence-based model. These include arguments that environmental law is unduly complex; that deterrence is
counterproductive and inefficient; that sanctions are inappropriate because of societal ambivalence toward pollution;
and that deterrence-based approaches inexorably lead to "bean counting" of enforcement actions as a way to evaluate
enforcement success. I have discussed these arguments and counter arguments at length in an earlier article.162 This
section focuses on several other arguments that are at the core of the complaint about deterrence-based environmental
enforcement: that firms comply because of adherence to social norms; that firms comply because of market forces; and
that enforcement efforts can be curtailed because of firms' self-policing practices.
Compliance Because of Adherence to Social Norms
Critics dispute the view of corporations as driven only by economic factors, and contend that corporate actors are
instead motivated by a variety of social, civic, and other considerations. Some argue that corporations conceive of
themselves as political citizens, who are ordinarily inclined to comply with the law, partially because of their belief in
the law, and partially as a matter of their long-term self-interest.163
The critics of deterrence-based enforcement are correct to reject an economically deterministic model as the only
explanation for voluntary compliance. Scholars Ian Ayres and John Braithwaite are closer to the mark in arguing that
firms have different "lexical orderings" of money and responsibility; that is, the behavior of regulated entities ranges
from those exclusively motivated by money to those for whom this goal is constrained to a greater or lesser degree by
ideals of social responsibility (some firms will insist on satisfying a minimum level of care before pursuing maximum
profits; others will engage in as much socially responsible activity as they can before it affects profitability, etc.).164
But bottom-line profitability still matters a great deal in industry choices about compliance, and often overcomes even
good-faith efforts to comply, especially for small- and medium-size businesses. Shameek Konar and Mark Cohen, for
example, found that firm size and financial ability were the most important determinants in whether firms reduced their
emissions from 1989 to 1992 of toxic chemicals required to be reported by the federal Emergency Planning and
Community Right-To-Know Act (EPCRA) (known as toxic release inventory (TRI) data); larger firms and those with
more resources are more likely to reduce emissions.165 A recent wide-scale investigative report of the mining industry's
compliance with safety requirements also underscores the central role of profitability in compliance decisions. The
investigation found massive fraud in mandatory tests for dust in underground coal mines. At close to half of the all
underground mines in the country, at least 15% of the air samples had so little dust that they were obviously fraudulent;
scores of miners and two dozen mine owners interviewed said that cheating on dust tests is common.166 The testing is
largely self-policed; industry operators are in charge of taking tests in their own mines with government supervisors
monitoring only one of every four tests taken by operators.167 The report asserts that fraud has been widespread [30
ELR 10819] since the 1970s because testing cuts into the slim profit margins of mining and because traditionally there
has been very little enforcement of testing requirements, by the federal government.168 The top federal mine safety
official commented that expecting operations to effectively police themselves "defies human nature."169 Other research
shows a direct link between compliance costs and rates of compliance. For example, one study found that the number
of incidents of illegal used oil dumping responds directly to the costs of legal waste management. A ban on usedoil
increases the frequency of illegal dumping in a state by 28%; conversely, as the price of salvage used oil increases,
unlawful dumping decreases. A review of pulp and paper mills found that as the cost of compliance rises, a plant is
more likely to violate its permit (a one standard deviation in the cost of compliance adds 2.8% to the probability of a
violation).170
Likewise, a number of observers have noted that environmental programs often hit a "green wall," a point at which an
organization refuses to move forward with its strategic environmental management program. The lack of progress
results from an uneasy fit of environmental management with traditional business functions and traditional business
culture. Environmental management programs still are largely judged on their ability to make money for the company
rather than their intrinsic merits.171
Moreover, many critics understate the role that ideological resistance to regulation plays in undermining compliance.
Absent deterrence, corporate actors are far more likely to adhere to laws that in their eyes are legitimate, particularly
when compliance is expensive. As Peter Yeager notes, corporations more frequently violate environmental protection
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laws and other social legislation than laws designed to protect the integrity of the marketplace (such as tax, securities,
unfair trade laws) because these laws do not enjoy the same legitimacy in the eyes of businesses.172
There is no question that many businesses remain philosophically opposed to some substantial portion of the current
regime of environmental regulation, and indeed, consider it illegitimate. This opposition has been fueled over the past 5
to 10 years by a drumbeat of intense criticism of EPA and other regulatory agencies. During the early days of the 104th
Congress in 1995, when the political climate seemed most sympathetic to corporate concerns, regulated entities
proposed radically weakening the major environmental statutes. In response, members of Congress, among other things,
sought to drastically rewrite the CWA and the Endangered Species Act (ESA), repeal the 1990 CAA Amendments, and
attach numerous riders to EPA's appropriations bill severely restricting the agency's ability to enforce existing laws.
Given this strong hostility to environmental regulation, it is naive to suppose that a deterrence orientation should be
abandoned because businesses will comply with these laws because of their identity as law-abiding citizens.
Compliance Because of Market Forces
Others emphasize that market forces make it a matter of self-interest for business to voluntarily comply with
environmental requirements. This argument has three related strands. First, compliance can often generate significant
savings for businesses. Some of these result because steps taken to adhere to regulatory requirements can also make a
firm more efficient, such as by reducing the costs spent on managing or disposing of wastes, reducing purchases of raw
materials or lowering energy costs. Professor Michael Porter prominently has argued that pollution is a form of
economic waste and that there are substantial savings to be realized through using resources more productively and
finding new uses for discarded materials.173 Indeed, there are now many case studies documenting impressive savings
achieved through pollution prevention (a term that refers to the use of materials, processes, or practices that reduce or
eliminate the creation of pollutants or wastes at the source). Compliance can also save money in other ways. A firm's
insurance premiums may be discounted based on its compliance record; likewise, investors and lending institutions may
perceive the firm as less risky and provide it with capital at lower cost. Being in compliance with environmental
regulations may lessen the likelihood that a firm will face third-party liability suits for environmental exposures.
Likewise, firms with a positive compliance history may have better relations with the surrounding community and
government agencies, making it less costly to obtain permits or other regulatory approvals.
Second, compliance and a reputation for superior environmental performance can lead to marketing and other
competitive advantages. Corporations see important benefits from being publicly perceived as environmentally
responsible entities, as evidenced most notably by the blitz of green products marketed over the past decade. Not
surprisingly, one study found that firms in industries with the greatest consumer contact were significantly more likely
to voluntarily reduce their emissions under EPA's voluntary 33/50 reduction program than other firms.174 Another
study, however, which examined the degree to which firms voluntarily reduced TRI emissions from 1989 to 1992,
failed to find any linkage with closeness to the consumer.175 In general, however, corporations that depend on consumer
relations may feel market pressure to comply with environmental regulations and be perceived as "clean" or "green."
Third, the stock market can provide an important impetus to improved environmental performance. There is a growing
socially responsible investment movement that evaluates the environmental record of companies as a basis for
investment in the stock market. According to one estimate, over $ 2 trillion is invested in firms based on social criteria;
a large majority of social investors (79%) screen assets for environmental issues.176 Additionally, several studies have
[30 ELR 10820] shown that capital markets react significantly to the release of environmental information: upward
when information reveals superior performance; downward when poor performance is revealed, including high levels of
routine emissions, the initiation of enforcement actions against a company, or oil or chemical spills.177 For example,
James Hamilton found that firms suffered statistically significant negative stock returns of between 0.2% and 0.3%, an
average loss per firm of $ 4.1 million in stock value, when TRI data was first disclosed in 1989.178 Konar and Cohen
found that the 40 firms with the largest decline in stock value on the date that the TRI data was publicized in 1989
subsequently lowered their emissions more than other firms in the same industrial sector, even those firms with the
largest emissions. These firms also were less likely to receive large fines from the government in subsequent years (and
had made more significant efforts to reduce the number and severity of oil spills). Madhu Khanna and his colleagues
also determined that chemical firms experienced statistically significant losses in market value on the day following
disclosure of TRI data in the years 1990 to 1994; firms with more releases had more negative returns.179 A study in
Mexico likewise found that publicly traded Mexican firms are significantly cleaner (and more likely to be in compliance
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with environmental laws) than their privately held counterparts.180 Moreover, some emerging research indicates that
better environmentally performing firms may generate higher returns than their dirtier competitors. A study by the
Alliance for Environmental Innovation, for instance, concluded that superior performing environmental firms
outperformed their peers on the stock market by as much as 2%.181 Likewise, an ICF Kaiser Consulting Group study of
327 Standard and Poor's 500 firms found that companies could increase stock prices by up to 5% by improving their
environmental management systems and their performance.182
While all of the above market forces—pressures to avoid economic waste, pressures to be "green," and stock market
forces—have changed the dynamics of environmental compliance, critics are mistaken in suggesting that these
considerations by themselves will result in widespread compliance with environmental laws.
First, as described above, compliance and pollution prevention will often avoid economic waste and thus improve
profitability. While this will motivate some companies to voluntarily obey regulations, it is incorrect to assume that this
will occur across the board. Quite simply, not all compliance measures translate into economic gains; many, to the
contrary, will directly increase a corporation's expenses. This is true of environmental improvements more generally; as
Professor Forest Reinhardt recently explained:
"Does it pay to be green?" Many business school academics and environmental leaders have answered yes.
Yet businesspeople are skeptical—and rightly so, since they instinctively reject such all-or-nothing
propositions in other contexts . . . . The answer, of course, is "It depends." . . . The truth is, environmental
problems do not automatically create opportunities to make money." At the same time, the opposite
stance—that it never pays for a company to invest in improving its environmental performance—is also
incorrect.183
In some instances, the benefits of compliance measures—such as steps taken to reduce risk or prevent accidents—may
be difficult to predict or quantify economically. Likewise, Professor Michele Ochnser points out that while many
pollution prevention projects may be the most cost-effective approach to regulatory compliance, they are not
necessarily profitable by themselves. She notes that a number of recent studies have suggested that regulatory
compliance, rather than economic incentives, is the most important factor in motivating pollution prevention
measures.184
Even environmental improvements that improve profitability sometimes are resisted by firms. Some may result in
savings in 5 to 10 years but cause short-term financial losses that cash-poor companies are hesitant to incur, or that
clash with the short-term profit orientation of many businesses.185 Other cost-saving steps may not be acted on because
they are not considered as high a priority as other business spending. This was the finding, for example, of an
interesting case study at a Dow Chemical facility in Texas. There, an independent pollution prevention assessor
identified strategies that would save the company more than $ 1 million a year, eliminate 500,000 pounds of waste, and
allow the company to shut down a hazardous waste incinerator. The strategies were not implemented, however,
because other investment opportunities were deemed more important.186
Moreover, some corporate managers and business consultants believe that many of the relatively easy gains from
pollution prevention or waste minimization have been made and that future environmental investments will be costly.187
Noah Walley & Bradley Whitehead, for instance, contend [30 ELR 10821] that "win-win" situations in which
environmentally beneficial projects create financial value are "very rare and will likely be overshadowed by the total
cost of a company's environmental program."188 A recent study conducted for Enterprise for the Environment confirms
this sentiment: it found that for most business managers, meeting traditional business targets were far more important
than meeting environmental goals. The survey also found that business managers do not generally perceive
environmental performance as a factor that increases business value.189 Professor Rena Steinzor makes a similar point.
Citing evidence such as a McKinsey & Company survey showing that many corporate executives believed that
environmental costs outweighed environmental opportunities, she concludes that publicly stated support for
environmental policies "have yet to overcome the perception that such efforts can be very costly and are not at the
heart of the corporate mission."190
Second, the reputational benefits of being perceived as green or environmentally responsible are important for firms
that directly market consumer products; indeed, consumers report that they consider the environmental reputation of a
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product or manufacturer to be an important purchasing factor.191 But there are significant limits to relying on the
consumer product marketplace as a way to reward positive environmental performance. As noted environmental writer
Frances Cairncross observes, consumers think "green" only when buying a limited range of products.192 Moreover, for
some products there are no readily available substitutes for consumers if they are dissatisfied with the record of a
manufacturer, or, perhaps more typically, available substitutes at comparable prices. Additionally, many consumers will
not have the time or interest to affirmatively seek out information about products; even if they do, judging among
competing claims of environmental performance may depend upon information that is complex, uncertain, and difficult
to obtain. Moreover, claims of superior environmental conduct are easily subject to manipulation by businesses; as two
observers note "the firm has enormous power to influence its environmental reputation, in part because objective
measurement of a firm's total environmental performance is practically impossible," and also because, as compared to
the general public, "it has vastly superior resources, controls most of the data, and often controls who does the
analysis."193
Likewise, for most regulated entities—those that do not sell consumer products—there are relatively few tangible gains
that come from being perceived as an environmental leader. Few commercial purchasers or suppliers use a firm's
environmental record as a criteria for doing business; likewise, few government programs provide direct rewards to
business for achieving environmental compliance. Finally, by itself, the market is unlikely to generate unfavorable
information about a firm's environmental record or the risks from a product. Individual firms will not produce or release
such data because of the negative implications surrounding such information, and third parties are not likely to produce
it because of the "public good" nature of such information.194
Third, capital markets cannot be heavily relied on to prompt environmental compliance or improved environmental
performance. First, and most fundamentally, the great majority of regulated firms are not publicly traded, but are small-
or medium-size businesses. Moreover, for publicly traded firms, market reactions tend to be most significant when
investors are provided with new information about a firm that leads them to revise their expectations regarding the
firm's profitability; the market reacts much less to disclosures about firms that are expected to be high polluters. Konar
and Cohen, for example, discovered that firms with the largest absolute TRI emissions were not those that suffered the
largest stock decreases. In turn, emissions reductions by the largest emitting firms were less significant than for those
which suffered the largest stock decreases.195 Hamilton also found in his study that the effects on stock value were
smaller for firms where investors had previous information about the firm's pollution patterns (such as where firms were
involved with Superfund sites).196
Additionally, as Cohen points out, the studies that show a decline in stock value when bad environmental news about a
firm is announced have not compared these losses to the cost of cleanup or penalties occasioned by the underlying
incident or enforcement action. In other words, they have not measured whether the decline in stock value reflects an
additional "reputation" penalty the market is imposing beyond a firm's actual costs, an additional penalty that could be
a deterrent to noncompliance in the first place. If instead the stock decline is only equal to or less than the cost of
compliance, it provides no financial motivation to comply. Two recent analyses found that stock price declines do not
exceed expected compliance costs. As Cohen argues, these studies call into question the effectiveness of the stock
market as an enforcement mechanism.197
Finally, investors may react less significantly to disclosure of a firm's noncompliance status if they do not believe that
the noncompliance will result in strong governmental enforcement. This is the conclusion of researchers who examined
the response of Canadian investors to disclosure of such information. In one study, the researchers found that [30 ELR
10822] unusual stock market losses resulted only when fines for environmental violations were imposed by the
government, and not when enforcement actions were announced.198 A later study showed that only when firms were
included twice on the environmental ministry's list of noncomplying or potentially risky facilities did the market react
significantly. The researchers suggest that Canadian investors may require stronger signals than investors in the United
States because of the conciliatory approach toward enforcement Canadian regulators have adopted in comparison to
that of the United States. They conclude that the ability to use information-oriented approaches to harness the power of
the marketplace "appears to be a function of the regulator's willingness to undertake strong enforcement actions," as
well as the capital markets ability to rank and compare firms with respect to environmental performance.199
Internal Regulatory Systems
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Commentators also argue that traditional enforcement approaches should be modified because many corporations have
adopted extensive internal regulatory programs and effectively police themselves. Self-regulation can take a number of
forms, ranging from relatively simple procedures for regularly monitoring for compliance, to sophisticated internal
programs or codes of conduct that some observers contend are more comprehensive and more effective than
government enforcement efforts.200
Two environmental self-policing practices have become particularly prominent in recent years. The first is
environmental auditing; many large-size firms now regularly conduct environmental audits to assure compliance with
regulatory requirements. A 1995 survey by Price Waterhouse, for instance, found that 75% of survey respondents
reported that they perform environmental audits.201 Some observers suggest that audits now are commonplace for most
large firms in the United States.202 The second is the adoption of EMS. EMS use has increased since the adoption of an
ISO EMS standard in 1996, ISO 14001 (which is part of a broader series of voluntary standards adopted by the ISO). In
Europe, the European Union has adopted a voluntary management system, the Eco-Management and Audit Scheme
(EMAS). One source very roughly estimates that 700 U.S. firms have been certified by registrars as in compliance with
ISO 14001203; another suggests that most large U.S. manufacturing firms and thousands of small- and medium-size firms
are working toward ISO certification.204
Related, some industries and other groups have adopted private, voluntary codes of environmental practice that rely on
EMS and similar systems-like approaches. The codes outline for participating firms environmental objectives broader
than compliance with regulatory standards (and indeed they do not include performance standards or mandate
compliance, as discussed below). The most prominent code is the Chemical Manufacturers Association's (CMA's)
Responsible Care(R) program, adopted in 1988, which consists of six codes encompassing 100 management practices.
Some others include the Coalition for Environmentally Responsible Economies (CERES) (formerly the Valdez)
principles, the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) Business Charter for Sustainable Development, and Natural
Step.205
The growth in auditing, EMSs, and other internal regulatory programs is very positive, and as discussed further below,
enforcement policies should provide significant incentives to encourage these self-policing efforts. Deterrence-based
enforcement policies should not be discarded, however, simply because of the increasing use of such systems.
First, there is little hard data demonstrating the degree to which these self-policing policies, in particular EMS and
codes of conduct, have actually enhanced compliance. As researcher Shelley Metzenbaum recently noted, "surprisingly
we are far from a clear answer [about] whether EMSs predictably improve environmental performance."206 Likewise,
Jennifer Nash and John Ehrenfeld conclude that as of yet, it is unclear whether codes of conduct have altered or will be
capable of altering the management culture and environmental consciousness of firms.207
At least a couple of studies have found that use of an EMS does not necessarily lead to better environmental
performance. For example, Jennifer Howard, Nash, and Ehrenfeld surveyed 16 firms that had adopted the CMA's
Responsible Care(R) program. In a majority (10 of 16) of these firms, respondents reported that the program had not
significantly changed the firm's internal behavior: either it had little impact on the firm's practices, or it was an adjunct
to and reinforced existing programs, used primarily to promote the firm's programs to outside stakeholders. The study
also found that Responsible Care(R) elicits the strongest response from companies in what the authors describe as the
"area of image manipulation." Firms were most uniform in adopting practices that are visible externally, such as
community relations and monitoring the practices of their distributors, while the firms differed on changes made to their
internal activities.208 The authors conclude that "adoption of the codes does not necessarily imply that a company is
complying with a new set of institutional standards."209
Another study by Andrew King and Michael Lennox found that firms that implemented the Responsible Care(R)
program did not improve their environmental performance [30 ELR 10823] (as measured by facility-level, toxicity-
weighted TRI emissions) any more than nonparticipating firms. The authors submit that some firms adopt the
management practices to burnish their image while failing to make behavioral changes, an outcome made possible by
the lack of explicit sanctions for noncomplying firms.210
Second, many firms—certainly the great majority of regulated entities—cannot afford environmental audits or
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management systems and do not have sophisticated internal regulatory programs. The Price Waterhouse survey, for
instance, found a direct correlation between the size of the company and the likelihood of an audit program; every
company with sales over $ 1 billion conducted audits, while less than half of companies with sales under $ 50 million
did.211 Management systems such as ISO 14001 likewise cost up to tens of thousands of dollars, even for medium-size
businesses.212 Similarly, thus far participation in the voluntary codes of conduct has been relatively limited, and most of
the participants have been large firms.213
Third, merely because a firm conducts an environmental audit does not ensure that it will correct any violations
detected, or of greater concern, take appropriate measures to prevent new violations from occurring. Environmental
groups who oppose extensive reliance on audits have pointed to instances in which corporations failed to correct
violations revealed to them during audits.214 Likewise, management systems are designed not to evaluate compliance
with regulatory requirements but to ensure that regulated entities have appropriate training, decisionmaking, and other
management systems in place. The ISO 14001 standard, for example, does not expressly guarantee compliance with
environmental requirements; moreover, it does not require any emission or discharge reductions, and by its own terms,
does not necessarily expect immediate, tangible improvements from the management system.215 The same is true for
most other voluntary industry codes, which do not set quantitative performance standards or mandate regulatory
compliance. Likewise, while EMS and other codes require firms to self-audit their adherence to internal systems, most
do not also require third-party verification of these audits. One study of Responsible Care(R) implementation (where
outside verification is not required) found that firms' self-reporting tends to mask significant differences in how they
have implemented the program.216 (Some observers, moreover, have questioned how knowledgeable many of the
outside auditors are with EMS and the quality of the third-party reviews that have been occurring.)217
Finally, and perhaps most fundamentally, the growth in self-policing by companies is directly linked to strong
governmental enforcement; without such enforcement, the incentives for companies to spend money on internal
compliance programs is greatly reduced. Thus, EPA has concluded that its strong enforcement efforts have played a
major role in the growth of environmental auditing in recent years. More than 90% of respondents in the Price
Waterhouse survey, for example, reported that they conduct audits at least in part to find and correct violations before
they were discovered by agency inspectors.218 These findings were replicated in a 1998 survey of auditing conducted by
the National Conference of State Legislatures.219 Another study by EPA found that environmental enforcement actions
were among the most important factors in getting businesses to consider environmental issues in the performance of
their duties.220 Likewise, a top compliance official with the California Air Resources Board reported that the number of
companies conducting environmental audits increased in direct proportion to the level of civil and criminal enforcement
by the agency.221 This sentiment is echoed as well by corporate environmental attorneys: one opined that without the
threat of a strong federal hand in enforcement, the company's environmental health and safety officer would return to a
lowly part of the corporate hierarchy and be staffed by a person "close to retirement, with no real power base in the
organization, and no staff—just window dressing."222
The Proper Balance of Deterrence and Cooperative Enforcement Strategies
Given the empirical evidence and competing theoretical arguments, what does the optimal enforcement approach
consist of? It is one that integrates constructive features of a cooperative system, such as compliance assistance
programs, and incentives for self-policing, but that is backed up by elements of a traditional deterrence approach,
reformed to be more creative and flexible. In addition, such a scheme [30 ELR 10824] would be aided by mandatory
disclosure requirements that generate market pressure for compliance.223
Integration of Constructive Features of a Cooperative System
Enhanced Compliance Assistance
One essential tool for improving compliance is enhanced technical and compliance assistance efforts. As described
above, the states and EPA have sharply expanded such programs over the past decade.
Compliance assistance programs should be directed largely at small businesses, many of whom lack the expertise and
resources needed to fully comprehend and comply with environmental regulations. Without doubt, environmental law
has grown quite technical and complex, posing great challenges for small businesses. The Massachusetts DEP, for
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example, estimated in the mid-1990s that two-thirds of its small- and medium-size businesses were out of compliance
with environmental laws.224 Likewise, an Illinois small business environmental task force found "a widespread and
pervasive 'fear factor' among small businesses. . . . [This includes] a fear by small businesses that they cannot determine
whether they need a permit or multiple permits from the [Illinois EPA]. They cannot determine how to determine what
regulations apply to them. And they cannot understand the multitude of regulations that may apply to them."225 Even
major firms acknowledge that full compliance with all environmental requirements is largely impossible.
Agencies should have separate inspectors carrying out these "advice and consultation" functions as opposed to the
agencies' traditional inspection and enforcement activities, or at least not assign inspectors to carry out these traditional
activities at the same facilities where they have provided special technical assistance. This will help minimize the risk
(and appearance) of preferential treatment by agency staff who have devoted considerable time and energy consulting
with a firm. The separation of function will also promote business confidence that the compliance assistance program
will not be used to gather evidence for later agency enforcement actions, and thus should prompt greater openness by
participating firms.226 Another alternative is for agencies to fund local trade associations to carry out compliance
assistance programs. For example, EPA partnered with several states and the Korean Dry Cleaners Association of the
Greater Washington, D.C. Area to develop a mentoring program in which experienced dry cleaners teach less
sophisticated owners about applicable requirements. A number of states also have used this approach. Agencies also
should employ aggressive outreach efforts in connection with their technical assistance programs, such as in Illinois,
where regulators carried out a publicity and ad campaign, organized workshops with trade associations, and contacted
facilities several times to enlist their participation in the state's "Clean Break" program.227
Incentives for Self-Regulation
To encourage regulated entities to develop internal regulatory systems, firms that conduct audits, implement
management systems, and carry out other self-policing efforts should be rewarded with meaningful enforcement
benefits. But self-policing systems should supplement, not replace, traditional enforcement activities, and audit
privilege and immunity laws should be resisted.
Proponents of privilege and immunity provisions argue that these laws create a vital incentive for firms to conduct
audits. Without them, many firms will forego audits because of fears that the information discovered will be used
against them in enforcement actions or in third-party lawsuits. In fact, the audit reports will provide a road map of
violations for enforcing agencies. Moreover, the argument goes, self-audits uncover and result in the correction of
many violations that the government would never discover on its own. Thus, absent protection from future
enforcement, firms will be exposing themselves to greater risk by conducting audits.
Critics of such laws argue they are not necessary to stimulate auditing. First, firms will voluntarily conduct audits for
self-interested business reasons: to avoid or reduce liability or cleanup costs, identify cost-saving pollution prevention
opportunities, obtain lower insurance rates, attract investors, generate favorable publicity, and so forth. Additionally,
government enforcement policies and practices provide very strong incentives for conducting audits.228 [30 ELR
10825] Moreover, even in the absence of such formal policies, state and local agencies inevitably consider a firm's
auditing practices when calculating penalties or making other enforcement decisions.229
This argument has been discussed at length and with great vigor for the past five years. Notably, the one systematic
study on this issue to date supports the view that privilege and immunity laws are not what motivates most firms to
audit. In a survey of close to 1,000 manufacturing facilities in 30 states with and without such measures, the National
Conference of State Legislators found that state audit and privilege laws do not encourage firms to begin auditing,
increase the number of audits they perform, or disclose more violations to regulators.230
Beyond the fact that privilege and immunity measures are unnecessary to promote voluntary auditing, they are
undesirable for several additional reasons. First, they complicate and increase the costs of enforcement. They make
certain categories of relevant information and witnesses unavailable to government enforcers, or available only after
litigation over what material is or is not privileged.231 These measures also undermine the incentives for facilities to take
preventative steps to achieve compliance. To varying degrees, they permit firms to sit back and waituntil an audit is
conducted before coming into compliance. Then, so long as a firm corrects and discloses the violations, its sanctionable
behavior will be excused, and it will be allowed to retain the economic benefit they obtain from noncompliance.
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Additionally, privilege laws keep information of a public character, reflecting whether a firm is in compliance with
publicly enacted requirements designed to protect the environment, secret and out of the public's reach. Regulated
entities are already required to monitor, record, and in many cases, report extensive aspects of their compliance with
environmental laws to government agencies. (A few European countries go further and mandate that companies
prepare public reports documenting environmental conditions at their facilities.)232 There are numerous benefits from
keeping audit information public. Such information can help investors in the securities markets make more intelligent
investment decisions. It is at least as relevant to some investors as financial audits, or information about environmental
enforcement actions and liabilities, which publicly traded corporations are already required to disclose. Likewise, audit
data can help consumers make better-informed decisions about whether to purchase a firm's products, allow workers to
negotiate for better working conditions or improved pay, and help local residents bargain with corporations and exert
pressure to improve their environmental practices. Moreover, disclosure of noncompliance itself can have an additional
(and important) deterrent effect, as discussed below. EPA has aptly concluded that "in the final analysis, an audit
privilege invites secrecy and breeds distrust."233
EPA's self-policing policy and similar state initiatives strike a better, albeit not perfect, balance between promoting
self-policing and retaining a meaningful deterrent component of enforcement. The policies provide strong
encouragement to audit by waiving all gravity-based penalties and generally not recommending criminal enforcement
when violations are voluntarily disclosed and corrected, but do not grant any privileges to audit documents. The
policies contain insufficient incentive, however, for firms to take steps to prevent violations before the audits are
conducted. The only sanction facing a firm that does not act proactively to achieve compliance is that EPA (or the
states) may seek to recover the economic benefit gained from noncompliance. But this merely puts a firm back in the
position it would have been if it had originally complied; it does not alter the firm's basic cost-benefit calculation in a
way to deterthe violations in the first place. A better approach would be to not waive all penalties, but to allow
enforcing agencies to consider the fact that violations were voluntarily disclosed and corrected when determining
enforcement responses and the size of penalties imposed. Audits should also be the basis for agencies to provide firms
with other enforcement and permitting benefits, such as less frequent inspections or inspections that are reduced in
scope, accelerated permit reviews, and eligibility to participate in other flexible regulatory initiatives.
Likewise, firms with EMS in place should be granted enforcement benefits, if a number of conditions are met: The
system requires compliance with environmental requirements and prophylactic measures to prevent violations in
advance of any self-audits; adherence to the system is verified by outside third parties, to ensure the system's integrity
to agencies, the public, and other private parties (i.e., firms and consumers doing business with the firm); and the EMS
provides the public with access to environmental information. In these circumstances, meaningful enforcement benefits
are appropriate, such as reducing facility inspections for these firms, and waiver of gravity-based civil penalties for the
violations, provided that the firms promptly correct any detected instances of noncompliance.
Basic Grounding in Deterrence, Made More Flexible
While expanding compliance assistance and incentive programs, agencies must maintain a strong, credible threat of
enforcement. As noted above, strong enforcement strengthens the internal regulatory systems of many companies, and
promotes voluntary compliance. To take one recent illustration, [30 ELR 10826] a Massachusetts survey of printing
firms found that 68% identified anticipation of an agency visit or enforcement action as a "strong motivation for
behavioral change and highly influential in their decisions to improve environmental practices."234 Conversely,
enforcement without the threat of meaningful sanctions often directly translates into noncompliance. As long-time
enforcement analyst Cheryl Wasserman notes, "it is now generally recognized that if the polluter expects no
consequence from noncompliance (except having to meet with government officials to agree to do what was required in
the first place), he has little incentive to undertake any costs of compliance before getting caught."235
Thus, agencies should continue to impose meaningful sanctions on violators, including recovery of economic benefit.
Amnesty laws and other provisions that automatically preclude sanctions for certain classes of violations or against
small businesses are generally undesirable. These measures remove any incentive for entities to comply prior to being
found in violation. (They are also unnecessary, since repeated empirical studies show that environmental requirements
are enforced in a pragmatic way.)
While a credible threat of sanctions for noncompliance is a necessary backdrop, there is room for more flexible and
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hybrid enforcement strategies. One of the consistent findings of the empirical research about enforcement is that
enforcement presence matters; more frequent inspections promote compliance. Thus, agencies should utilize
streamlined enforcement practices that allow them to conduct more inspections. For instance, a number of states have
shortened their traditional RCRA inspections, and expanded the number of facilities visited, by concentrating on more
significant areas of compliance, reducing checklist items, and reducing inspection reports. Such sacrifices in the breath
of inspections are desirable to significantly increase inspection coverage.
Likewise, agencies should make greater use of expedited enforcement approaches that save staff (and regulated firms')
resources. One example is field citations. These are citations issued in the field that address a clear-cut violation,
require the violator to correct the violation, carry a small penalty, and provide for some type of appeal.236 They have
proven effective in a variety of contexts. For instance, in New Mexico, when the state relied on traditional methods to
enforce its underground storage tank requirements, only 14% of the owners/operators who were found in violation
complied with the agency's orders. By contrast, 82% of owners/operators cited as part of the field citation program
corrected their violations and achieved compliance.237 A related concept is to cut penalties in exchange for immediate
correction of violations discovered during inspections. OSHA's "Quick Fix Program," for example, provides reductions
in penalties of 15% to employers that abate certain hazards within 24 hours of an inspection.238
Agencies should also employ hybrid approaches that combine compliance assistance and traditional enforcement
techniques. One example is Massachusetts' Environmental Results Program. For targeted sectors, the program replaces
the existing state permitting system with industrywide performance standards, supplemented by workbooks, training
sessions, and other compliance assistance to regulated entities. Each facility must certify annually that it is in
compliance with all applicable standards; a company out of compliance must disclose its status and submit a "return to
compliance" plan. All facilities are subject to regular inspections and the state's standard enforcement protocol,
including actions for failure to comply with certification requirements. Disclosing a violation to the state along with a
return to compliance plan does not shield a company from enforcement. Early results from the program show some
success; a survey of printers found that for those participating in the program, their scores on 19 "environmental
business practice indicators"—which include compliance with regulatory requirements, pollution prevention
techniques, and environmental management practices—were 50% higher than for the same facilities before
participation in the program, as well as 50% higher than nonparticipating facilities.239
In another project, Illinois EPA replaced its standard inspections of RCRA generators with fewer than 200 employees
with "compliance assistance surveys." During these modified inspections, inspectors both conduct an abbreviated
inspection focusing on key RCRA requirements and provide compliance assistance to facilities. If significant violations
are detected, inspectors convert the visit into a full-blown inspection, and firms are subject to standard sanctions. All
other firms are given the opportunity to remedy any violations detected either during the inspection or within the
subsequent 90 days. If they fail to do so, they are subject to sanctions. Through use of these shortened inspections, the
Illinois EPA has been able to increase by almost tenfold the number of generators it visits. It also reports that the
combination of more inspections, compliance assistance, and sanctions in the event of noncompliance has increased the
level of compliance among these generators from 65% at the time of initial inspection to 95% three months later.240
Another effective technique is to offer and heavily promote compliance assistance and/or compliance incentive
opportunities for designated facilities, immediately followed by enhanced inspection and enforcement activities. EPA
recently has done this with a couple of industrial sectors in order to encourage firms to conduct voluntary audits, with
some apparent success.241 A different variant is to provide a targeted sector with a penalty cap if facilities disclose [30
ELR 10827] and correct violations within a limited time frame, again followed by increased enforcement for
nonparticipating facilities. EPA reports positive results from several such efforts. In one case, when EPA capped
penalties for facilities required to report risk information under the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA), the agency
received over a hundred fold increase in the number of mandatory reports submitted.242
There are other innovative combinations of deterrence and cooperative-based tools. These combined tools will work
best if they are backed by a credible threat of sanctions in the event of noncompliance.
Mandatory Disclosure of a Firm's Compliance Status
One interesting and heretofore little tried alternative that merits close attention is compelled public disclosure of the
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compliance and performance status of regulated entities. As discussed above, exclusive reliance on market pressures,
including the capital markets, to ensure compliance is insufficient. Nonetheless, mandated disclosure as an adjunct to
other enforcement activities could generate important pressure for compliance and improved performance.
As noted earlier, disclosure of a firm's emissions or exposures can generate pressure for improved environmental
performance. The most prominent example is the TRI program; facilities subject to this program from 1988 to 1998
have reported a 45% decline in their releases of covered chemicals. (In 1998, seven additional industries were required
to report releases, and as a result, the total toxic releases reported rose nearly threefold from the amount reported
previously.)243 California's Proposition 65, which requires warnings prior to exposures to listed carcinogens and
reproductive toxins, also has generated considerable product reformulations and emission reductions. Moreover, as also
noted, a number of studies show reductions in the market value of poor environmental performers when information
about their performance is released. Notably, this includes information about their compliance status, including the
initiation of enforcement actions. S.G. Bandrinath and P.J. Bolster found that between 1977 and 1986, stockholders
suffered a statistically significant loss of 1.2% in market value when lawsuits or settlements (generally involving a
penalty) under RCRA or Superfund were announced. Another study of stock market reactions to 730 EPA judicial
actions for a sample of publicly traded firms from 1972 to 1991 found that the market value of the average affected
firm dropped 0.43% during the week of settlement. The estimated market penalty was larger for more recent actions
and for repeat offenders.244 (The authors argue that better information, if available, would elicit a stronger market
reaction.)245 Susmita Dasgupta et al. found in a study of developing countries that stock values rise when positive
environmental performance is publicized by the government, and fall in response to citizen complaints about firms.246
As noted above, Cohen correctly cautions that without more particular research, it is difficult to tell whether the decline
in stock value measured by some of these studies reflects an additional "reputation" penalty that the market is imposing
beyond a firm's actual costs.
Nonetheless, even apart from stock market impacts, public disclosure of environmental performance can create
additional and strong incentives for pollution control. Some preliminary support for this idea comes from three
interesting, if limited, studies.
In one project, Indonesia's environmental agency developed a four color-coded rating system for "grading" the
environmental performance of industrial facilities: the scale included facilities making no effort to control their
pollution discharges (black), just satisfying applicable standards (blue), performing substantially better than regulations
required (green) and performing truly exceptionally (gold). (The colors were chosen because they had cultural
connotations in Indonesia analogous to the environmental performance levels they signified.)247 The grades for the
facilities were publicly disclosed (although there was a six-month delay in disclosing firms in the worst two categories
to allow them an opportunity to improve their performance). One year after the project began, 34 of 120 factories that
were initially listed in the worst two noncompliance categories had progressed to one of the two higher grades,
reflecting at least compliance with all criteria in applicable regulations. This represents an increase in compliance of
29%. Moreover, the plants subject to the first public disclosure in 1995 reduced their emission of BOD by
approximately 45% within a period of 18 months.248
A study of compliance and emission levels by 15 pulp and paper firms in British Columbia from 1990 through 1996
likewise found significant impacts from the disclosure of firms' environmental performance. During this period, the
regional environmental agency published twice a year a list of firms that did not comply with existing water pollution
regulations (and until 1994, also a list of firms whose environmental performance was "of concern" to the agency). To
be included in the noncompliance section of the list, a firm had to be "significantly" out of compliance. (Firms were
listed as "of concern" if they were technically in compliance but their operations nonetheless posed potential
environmental threats.) The agency also pursued traditional enforcement approaches for those out of compliance. The
study shows that being on the public list of noncompliers led to improvement rates of 20% for BOD emissions and
around 8% for TSS emissions, and absolute decreases in the amount of emissions by around 1,100 kilograms (kg)/day
and 1,250 kg/day, respectively. (These impacts were actually greater than those generated by enforcement orders and
penalties; the study predicted that a doubling of fines would lead to a 15% improvement in the BOD compliance rate,
but have no effect on TSS emissions.)
Conversely, one analysis attributes substantial improvements in the compliance rates of auto service and repair [30
ELR 10828] shops in Santa Rosa, California (discussed above) in part to a program of positive public recognition for
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shops certified as being in compliance with five environmental programs. From 1994 to 1998, only 4% of facilities
certified as "green" committed significant violations of any environmental requirement; moreover, city inspectors also
reported a sharp drop in the number of inspections required to confirm compliance.249 (As noted above, city officials
believe that the city's enhanced technical assistance programs also substantially contributed to improved compliance
rates.)
EPA recently has begun providing information about the compliance status of facilities with its Sector Facility Indexing
Project (SFIP). The SFIP provides public access to detailed environmental profiles on approximately 650 facilities in 5
major industrial sectors, including their compliance history under the CWA, the CAA, and RCRA, and their record of
spills and releases. This includes information within the past two years about noncompliance, permit exceedances,
inspections, and closed enforcement actions, as well as whether the facility is currently in significant noncompliance. It
also includes data about TRI releases and off-site transfers, including releases of carcinogens, a firms' ratio of chemical
releases to production capacity, and recent spills.250 EPA does not, however, rank or evaluate the facilities, or publicize
noncomplying or superior performing firms, leaving it to outside organizations to draw such conclusions from the
data.251 EPA and other agencies should move in this direction, directly reporting, in easily understandable and
accessible form, the relative compliance status of various firms. This type of disclosure should be an important spur for
improved environmental performance. There has been enormous public interest, for example, in the Environmental
Defense Chemical Scorecard website, started in 1998, which ranks facilities in local communities based on TRI
emissions and selected criteria air pollutants and compares communities based on various emissions and risks from
hazardous air pollutants.252
Conclusion
Considerably more research is necessary before we can definitively conclude what implements in the toolbox of
cooperation and enforcement tools works best to promote compliance. In particular, we are just in the early stages of
gathering empirical data about how effective compliance assistance and compliance incentive programs are. Our
experience to date, however, suggests that it would be ill-advised to make a wholesale shift away from
deterrence-based practices. Rather, the best approach is one grounded in deterrence theory but that includes
constructive features of a cooperative system.
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